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The Problem.—The problem of this study is to determine how the
various elements or changes in the structure and activities of the
petroleum industry affected the growth and development of the Ashland
Oil and Refining Company from 19^-1955*
Some of the problems which occured during this period and which
are investigated in this study are as follows:
1. Governmental attempts at regulation
2. Imported oil
3. World War II and its consequences
4. Postwar increase in demand for petroleum products
5. Changes in refinery operations
There were numerous other problems that confronted the industry as
well as the Ashland Oil and Refining Company during the period 1940-1955;
however, those listed above were the more dominant and important ones.
Significance.—This study brings out some of the complexities in¬
volved in the management and control of companies in the oil industry and
how these complexities are overcome by sound and efficient management.
It is hoped that this study will serve as an incentive for further
studies to be made of this industry and of the companies which are a part
of it.
Hynotbesis.—The basic hypothesis is that the Ashland Oil and
Refining Company, like many other small companies in the petroleum
industry continued to grow and prosper in spite of the many problems
1
2
•with which it was confronted by the larger companies and the ever changing
capitalistic economy of the United States.
Method of Study,—In preparing for this study, information was
gathered from recent book publications on the subject, from textbooks and
class notes, annual reports, pamphlets, booklets and other information
contributed by -the various oil companies. After -the completion of many
hours of research on "this material, it was organized and compiled into
this study.
The first chapter is concerned "with an introduction to the problems
which confronted Ashland Oil and Refining Company as well as the petroleum
industry during the period of study. Chapter II deals -with some background
information and the historical setting of the petroleum industry. Included
is, a brief history of the industry, its role in our economy, the competi-
ti've conditions, and other characteristics. Chapter III contains the his¬
tory of the Ashland Oil and Refining Company and shows how the various
problems of the period affected the growth and de-velopment of the company.
The final chapter includes the summary and conclusions reached by the
writer.
Related Literature.—Many studies have been made of the oil indus¬
try, but only a few ha-ve been made of indi-vidual companies within the in¬
dustry, Perhaps, the most outstanding to date is The History of the
Standard Oil Company (190U), by Ida Tarbell. This book gives an account
of the origin, growth, and influences of the Standard Oil Trust. It
illustrates the methods by which the Standard Oil Company gained control
of the petroleum output.
An outstanding study made of the industry is John G, McLean and
Robert W, Haigh's The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies (l95i;). An
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examination is made of the changes which have come about because of the
participation of the small or minor companies refinery operations. The
Empire of Oil (1955)» Harvey O'Connor is another outstanding book writ¬
ten about the oil industry. It discusses the scope and organization of
the industry, of refinery and distribution, and of conservation and na¬
tionalism. This study criticizes the industry's powerful influence on
the foreign and domestic oil supply and stresses the need for interna¬
tional control of oil. Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum
Industry (195U), by Ralph Cassady is part one of a monograph series and
it explains the price making procedures at all levels of the industry.
A thorough investigation of the forces which determine the level of prices
in the oil industry is given in A National Policy for the Oil Industry
(I9li8), ty Eugene V, Rostow. Also, an examination is made of the system
of law which defines public policy toward the industry.
CHAPTER II
THE INDUSTRY
Its Role in the Economy,—It has been said, and with complete
justification that anyone who wants to understand the United States must
xinderstand big business* It is no less true that to xinderstand big busi¬
ness one must understand oil. Oil is big business incarnate.
In 1955> thare were thirty corporations in the United States with
assets over a billion dollars. Ten of these gigantic corporations were
oil companies. These companies were among the U2,000 participating in
the production, refining, transportation, and marketing of petroleum
products,^
More than twenty-six hundred products or gradations of products
are produced by the petroleum industry. Some of these are gasoline, kero¬
sene, motor oils, lubricating oils, fuel oil, synthetic rubber, floor oil,
floor wax, paints, dyes, asphalts, candles, cleaning compounds, greases,
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insecticides, and chewing gum wax.
The petroleum industry constitutes a large customer for a wide
range of other industries and serves almost the entire economy with essen¬
tial goods and services. Consequently, the well-being of the oil industry
is of great importance to our whole economy. The nature of its business
Ifhe American Petroleum Institute, There's a Place for You in the
Oil Industry (New York, 1955), p. 2.
2
Ralph Cassady, Jr., Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum
Industry (New Haven, 19514-), pp. 6-7. ~~
k
5
is that of mass production, turning out large volumes of standardized
commodities at low costs.^
Petroleum products are essential here in the United States in all
walks of life. They are essential to most industries as well as the ul¬
timate consumer. They are necessary for both war and peacetime purposes.
Without these products, the standard of living that is enjoyed in this
country would be practically non-existent, because it is a direct reflec-
tion of the power and energy that has been developed. Petroleum which
supplies over two-thirds of the total, is our leading source of energy
and power.
Another reason why petroleum products are essential to our economy
is that there are no free and immediate substitutes for them. Either free
substitution is not practicable at all (as in the case of fuel, other than
gasoline for use in pleasure cars) or is of the limited type (as in the
3
case of heating oil versus coal).
It can be stated without difficulty that the role of the petroleum
industry in our economy is more than that of being one of the largest
American industries in teims of the money, steel, and men engaged in pro¬
ducing and selling it. It is essential for the well-being of our entire
economy in both war and peace, and it supplies almost the entire economy
with its products, which are produced in large volumes of standardized
^Joseph E. Pogue, Economics of the Petroleum Industry (New York,
1939), p. 3.
2
Op. cit., pp. 11-16.
^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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commodities at low costs. The petroleum industry serves as the leading
source of energy and power in the United States and provides employment
for 1,650,000 people.^
This gigantic industry has grown tremendously through the years,
and has become one of the nation's most important industries. As time
passes on, with continued growth in size as well as importance, this
industry will achieve greater prominence serving our economy with its
essential goods and services.
Brief History.—For thousands of years, men have known about pe¬
troleum which seeped from the earth in small quantities in many different
locations. It wasn't until 1859 that man found a way to find oil. In
August of that year, the first well was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania
p
by Edwin Drake. After two months of drilling, Drake's well struck oil at
69i feet. People flocked into the area to drill other wells. Word of
this phenomenal event spread throughout the world, and stimulated similar
efforts many other places. Almost overnight, the modern oil inudstry was
3
born."^
The early years of the industry were dominated entirely by John D.
Rockefeller and his Standard Oil Company. It was during this period that
he built a fortune selling kerosene and a few lubricants.
In 1901, after oil was found in Texas on Spindletop^ near Beaumont,
^American Petroleum Institute, op. cit., p. 2.
2American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum in our Age of Science
(New York, 1958), p. 3»
3
Stewart Schackne and N. D'Arcy Drake, Oil for the World (New York,
1955), p. 26.
^Spindletop is the name given to this field by the townspeople of
Beaumont.
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the industry began to change in structure. Kerosene was the chief product,
but there was a great demand for crude oil and residual oil as fuel. Also,
the mass production of automobiles initiated by Henry Ford in 1908, created
a demand for gasoline, lubricants, and other petroleum products.^ Gasoline
quickly replaced kerosene as the number one product.
During this period, as the industry was experiencing this structural
change, another important development took place. In 1911, the Standard
Oil Company was dissolved by a Supreme Court decree, subsequently separating
this company into thirty-four different companies operating in different
areas throughout the country. Most of these companies have grown to become
leading competitors in their respective marketing areas.
After the Standard Oil decree, many new companies came into existence
and the industry grew rapidly. One of the reasons for this rapid growth was
World War I. Immediately after the war, there was an increase in demand for
petroleum products, and the demand eventually exceeded supply. Oil had to
be imported from Mexico. As a result of this and the fear of an oil short¬
age here in the United States, stimulation to find more oil increased.
Another factor contributing to this rapid growth was the enormous
amount of crude oil supplies which were thrown on the market from time to
time. These large supplies were occasioned by oil discoveries and by legal
and economic compulsions iidiich prompted leaseholders to produce their pro-
p
perties as rapidly as possible once a new field was discovered. A build
^Joseph L. Massie, Blazer and Ashland Oil (N. P., I960), p. 1.
2
The finding of oil during this time was governed by the rule of
capture. If a person found oil, he got all he could, because his neighbor
would get it if he didn't. The saying of the times was "get your neighbors
oil before he gets yours."
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up of the crude oil supply began in this period, and for almost fifteen
years this over supply existed,^ This condition threatened to destroy the
pricing structure of the entire petroleum industry. Laws had to be en¬
acted and enforced by state legislatures and the federal government to
bring the industry back under control in 1935,
The finding of oil in East Texas in 1930 is probably the most im¬
portant factor leading to the enactment of additional laws and codes con¬
cerning the oversupply and the wasting of oil during this period. When
C, M. Joiner struck oil in the East Texas field, hundreds of people rushed
in to drill for oil, and shortly thereafter, the flood of cheap oil flood¬
ed the market. Gasoline was sold in cities where depression hit car owners
were glad to save money on gas, and without a thought of brand names.
In order to put a halt to this type of activity and to bring the
market back under control, laws were passed by state legislatures and enr-
forced in some fields at "bayonet pointj the National Industrial Eecovery
Administration began to impose code rules, the Interstate Oil Compact Com¬
mission was created and the proration laws were adhered to by the various
oil producing states. Many of the small refineries were forced to close
down. In East Texas, only three small refiners remained. Law and order
2
once again prevailed in the oil industry.
The oil industry as well as other segments of our economy began
preparing for World War II in 19ii0, During the war, oil played an impor¬
tant part. Without it, victory would not have been achieved. After the
^John C, McLean and Robert 7<'. Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil
Companies (Boston, 195U), p. llU,
%arvey O'Connor, The Empire of Oil (New York, 1955), pp, 17-18.
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irar, the industry was confronted with many post-war problems, and before
it could overcome these problems, another conflict was in sight} namely,
the Korean War, however, this problem lasted only a short time and by 1955*
the industry was moving back toward its normal routine.
Competitive Conditions.—The nature of the competition in the oil
industry is of two types. The first type is found in crude production
phase and the second type is found in product phase of the industry. In
the crude production phase, the crude oil is purchased by a relatively
small number of buyers from a large number of sellers at posted prices set
by the buyers. Competition is restricted by governmental authority, where¬
by sellers are limited in the amount of crude oil they can sell} however,
it is not entirely eliminated because buyers and sellers still have to find
suppliers and customers.
An entirely different type of competition exists in the product phase
of industry operations. There are no governmental restrictions and the
prices are typically seller priced. Competitive conditions at this phase
usually emphasize the finding of markets instead of supplies.^ Also, at
this stage both price and non-price competition exist.
Crude oil is produced in twenty four states of this country. In 1950,
there were about 12,500 producers operating li66,000 producing wells. Most
of the oil is produced in Texas, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Kansas.
After the crude oil is produced, it is transported to refineries by railway
tank cars, pipelines, trucks, boats, and sometimes by a combination of
routes.^
^Cassady, op. cit., pp. 31-35.
2
Eugene V. Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil Industry (New Haven.
19li8), p. 11. —
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Oil is refined in over 3$0 refineries throughout the country. These
refineries are usually located in consuming areas rather than in production
areas. This is done to protect against obsolescence in the event of a shift
in source of supply from one field to a new one.
Most of the refineries are owned by the major companies,^ but there
are some smaller firms who own refining facilities. Their activity norm¬
ally extends over a limited geographical area only. The number and char¬
acter of these firms differ from market to market, but they play an impor¬
tant role in oil company competition since they usually have to compete
2
aggressively for customer as well as use price as a major competitive weapon.
Petroleum products reach the market in a variety of channels. They
may go by direct sales to large customers, through tied or independent
jobbers, or through the refining company's own retail distribution system
to ultimate consumers.
The major companies own a large share of the market for most petro¬
leum products, but only a few of these companies operate on a national
scale. In fact, in 19U9, only one major company, the Texas Company, oper¬
ated in all I4.8 states and the District of Coliimbia. Exhibit I gives the
breakdown of the number of states in which nineteen major oil companies
3
operated in 19U9.
The selling of petroleum products is characterized by competitive
^Major companies are the large integrated oil companies. Twenty
of these firms were classified as major companies in 1955. The rest are
called minor or independent companies.
2
Cassady, op. cit., pp, 32-37.
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behavior which is found in an oligopolistic market.
An oligopolistic market is defined as a market where there are a
few sellers who produce most of the industry's output, and whose products
are identical in nature. They are differentiated by use of brand names,
trademarks, packaging, etc. Also, sales of one company depend strongly
2
on the reactions of its close rivals to a price increase or decrease.
Exhibits II and III illustrate what happens when one firm changes its
price and how the change affects other firms in the industry.
Exhibit II shows that if there is a price cut by one firm, and the
industry does not match this price cut, sales for the price cutting firm
will expand along the elastic curve It also shows that if the other
firms match the price decrease, sales will expand less substantially along
the less elastic curve D2.
Exhibit III shows that if one firm initiates a price increase and
rivals match the increase, there will be an increase in revenue, and sales
will be maintained along the almost elastic curve Dj. On the other hand,
if rivals do not match the price increase, sales of firm initiating the
3
price increase will decrease sharply along the D2 curve.
In the petroleum industry, there is a fear of "spoiling the market,"
and a disinclination to undertake open price competition. Each seller
knows that his share of the market supply is a significant fraction of the
^Rostow, 00. cit., p. 12.
Marshall Coleberg, William Bradford and Richai*d Alt, Business
Economics ~ Principles and Cases (Homewood, 1957), pp. 211-21?.
^The demand curves in both exhibits were drawn on the assiunption
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total supply, and they realize that price changes on either's part will be
met by comparable changes on the part of their competitors. Thus, a price
cut, in most instances, could not be expected to change any seller's share
of the market, but could be expected to reduce every firm's level of
profit.^
Pricing policies of the oil industry are rather complicated. There
are several levels that petroleum products must go through before they
reach the ultimate consumer. First, there is the crude oil phase where
the oil is produced. After it is produced, it is transported to the re¬
fineries. Once the oil is refined, the products are distributed for re¬
sale purposes} then they are transported and delivered to various outlets
for retail pricing.
Crude oil pricing is characterized by having the prices posted by
buyers. Prices are posted to notify the seller at which price the buyer
will purchase the oil, to tell royalty owners the basis at which royalty
interest may be settled, and to inform customers of oil merchants the
terms at which the crude oil may be purchased.^
From time to time, crude oil prices change, but they are relatively
stable. An important reason for this stability in price is that because
of pipeline connections, sellers are not able to shift from one buyer to
another at will. Another reason for this stability is that crude oil
^Postow, op, cit., pp, 12-13,
2
Royalty interest is that amount of cash which is paid to land-
owners for the leasing of land owned to an oil company to carry on the
exploration of oil. Usually, the landowner receives 1/8 of the value
of the oil produced,
3
Cassady, op. cit., p, 117.
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prices are set by buyers, and a considerable amount of ill will is created
when price cut is announced. Also, price stability is intensified by the
existence of prorationing, which applies only to crude oil and not to
petroleum products.
Price leadership is found at this levels however, no one company
always assumes the role of price leader, and the leader is not always suc¬
cessful in making a price change.^ In order to make a price change, a
buyer can initiate the change, follow a change made by another buyer, or
refuse to follow the change made by another buyer. Price changes may come
about by one of the following;
1. Change in demand for petroleum products
2. Change in the amount of crude oil available for use in
refining operations
3. Changes in the cost of finding oil
U. Secondary factors, such as the price of crude oil in onOgarea
as compared with another, and the price of imported oil.
Prices at the refining level are of four types. They can be posted
l^y the sellerj they can be negotiated between buyers and sellers; they can
be set by specification and competitive bidding, or they may be set by
means of a trading transaction. Large comercial consumers (excluding motor
manufacturers and railroads) usually buy at posted prices,^ or by
^Price leadership is a practice whereby an important firm in an
industry decides upon and initiates a price change which is followed by
the other companies in the industry. The largest firm frequently acts
as the price leader, although at times other firms may initiate the price
change,
2
Cassady, op. cit., pp. 123-126.
3̂These posted prices are published by such reporting agencies as
the Tfllall Street Journal, the New York Journal of Commerce, the Oilgram, the
National Petroleum News and the Oil Daily,
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negotiation. Motor car manufacturers, railroads, government agencies and
a few other large firms buy on specification and competitive bidding.
Trading transactions take place when there is an excess of a product by
two firms at two different points in which they operate, where crosshauling
is necessary for each supplier if the product is to be moved where it is
required. This type of transaction can also take place when there are
similar volume requirements for two firms and when there is a substantial
degree of similarity in the product required t(y two firms.
Pricing at the resale level is usually related to some quotation,
which is published by the various reporting agencies. These prices to some
extent, are determined by negotiation, and are dependent upon changes in
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products at other levels. Sale of
products is done through independent jobbers, through company owned bulk
plants, through distributors for rebrand, and directly to consumers.^
The tank-wagon price is the established prices of gasoline and
other petroleum products as they are delivered by truck to the retailers
2
and to commercial consumers, ”It is next to the price of the pump itself,
the grassroots price in the business, sensitive to all the influences which
affect the ultimate consumer.”^
These prices which are posted by sellers are related to the basic
source from which the supplies originate. The further the distance from
the source of destination, the higher the price of the product to be sold,^
^Cassady, op. cit., pp. 177-197.
2
Harold Fleming, Oil Prices and Competition (New York, 1953), p. 26.
3 ^Fleming, ibid.. pp. 26-27.
^Cassady, op. cit., pp. 198-235.
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At the retail price level, petroleum products are sold directly to
consumers, although a great many of them are sold before they reach this
level.
Price leadership is found at this level of the market. In the oil
industry, price leadership technically, applies only to announced changes
and not to individual variations from the published quotations. The
reason for .this being that many of -the variations from the posted price
are secret and are made during the heat of the competitive struggle, and
often there is no need for matching prices of this sort because the trans¬
action to which the reduced price was related would have been completed,^
No one company acts as the price leader for the entire industry.
Instead, there are certain marketing areas scattered throughout the country,
where a large firm usually acts as the price leader. Rostow says that the
leading local survivors of the Standard Oil Trust serve as price leaders
2
in the industry. Whenever the leader posts a price, and a large seller
deviates from this price, and others follow suit, it may cause a disturb¬
ing price war.
Gasoline, the chief product of the industry, is sold at retail
along with several other petroleum products. The overall demand for it is
considered to be inelastic. It is considered to be inelastic because there
are no readily acceptable substitutes for it, and is considered a necessity
for those who use it. Although, the total demand for gasoline is consider¬
ed inelastic, the demand for individual sellers is highly elastic. As stated
previously, demand in the oil industry is sensitive to price changes,
j ^Cassady, ibid., p. 99,
2
Rostow, op. cit., p. lU.
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differences in quality, quantity, services, and other factors which char¬
acterize an oligopolistic market.
The overall demand for most of the other petroleum products is
considered elastic. Most of them are in direct competition with products
of other industries.^ An example of this is natural gas versus coal.
There are three main types of retail outlets for gasoline and
several petroleum products. They are company owned and operated stations,
company owned and dealer operated stations, and dealer owned and dealer
operated stations. In company owned-dealer operated stations and dealer
owned-dealer operated stations, pricing is the responsibility of the
o
dealer.
No matter what retail outlet is being used, pricemakers at this
level are greatly influenced by supplier prices and policies. This is
because the supplier's prices make up a large proportion of the retail
price, and because the supplier has an important stake in the retailer's
price. The wholesale price of gasoline makes up a large percentage of the
retail price. The margin retained by the dealer is relatively small, and
any change in the wholesale price has a definite effect upon the retail
price.
Most suppliers have an interest in the price of the product after
it has been sold to the dealer. This is because the product has a high
degree of elasticity in its demand for any one seller, and if these
dealers are given a free hand in pricing the product, price disturbances,
^Rostow, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
^McLean, op. cit., pp. U76-I4.78.
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which undoubtedly will lead to price wars, will exist,^
The market for petroleum products is a highly competitive one.
Even though the market may seem calm at times, there is always a vigorous
amount of competition carried on between oil companies in their struggle
for a share of the market. All companies, both major and minor, keep
their watchful eyes on the market situation, and are constantly changing
methods and procedures to keep abreast with the market so that they will
be able to create more consumer preference and increase the demand for
their particular products.
Other Characteristics,—The petroleum industry is characterized by
large fiinns which are vertically integrated. Vertical integration is de¬
fined as "a combination uniting in one coirporate structure, the various
operations through which the raw material passes in its transformation into
prefined products ready for the market,” Vertical integration has, through
the years, become the predominant form of business organization in the in¬
dustry because the economic climate in the industry has been generally
favorable to the integration process. Certain general and transitory
conditions as well as the absence of serious obstacles have been important
factors in making the economic climate favorable to integration,
A general condition which has caused many firms to vertically in¬
tegrate is that of the variation in profit opportunities. Profit oppor¬
tunities at the various levels of industry operations have a tendency to
fluctuate, especially at the refining level. In order to gain protection
^Cassady, on. cit., pp. 476-478.
George Wolbert, American Pipelines (Norman, 195^ p, 4.
against these fluctuations, stabilize earnings and create better profit
opportunities, companies have embarked on programs of vertical inte¬
gration.^
Another general condition which has been favorable to the inte¬
gration process in the industry, is the economic characteristics of
physical facilities. Some of the facilities and equipment used in the
petroleum industry involve large capital outlays and are highly special¬
ized. Examples of this would be refining plants and pipelines. These
facilities are extremely vulnerable to reductions in volume of through¬
put or output, and are heavily dependent upon supporting investments in
other phases of the business for their competitive effectiveness. There¬
fore, the investment in these type of facilities is associated with a
high degree of risk. Vertical integration is a means of reducing the
2
amount of risk.
The final general condition favorable to vertical integration is
that of the managerial job. The nature of this job is such that important
benefits have been and are available to the companies which were successful
in developing integrated structures along with efficient techniques for
administering their affairs on an integrated basis. The integrated company
management can do a more effective job of regulating the flow of capital
funds into the business than can the management of non-integrated companies
The management of integrated companies can handle more easily the
problems associated with the production, refining, and distribution process
., op. cit., pp. 663-66I1.
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than can the management of a non-integrated company. For an integrated
conqjany, the management is in a position to have an intimate knowledge of
activities at all levels of the business, and can do a more effective job
of planning and adjusting operating programs to shifts and changes in
market conditions than can the management of a non-integrated coraparQr.
Also, the management of an integrated company, by virtue of its
activities in different phases of the business, frequently has a wider
selection of investment opportunities that would be open to it than would
be available to a non-integrated company.^
A second set of conditions which have helped to make the economic
climate favorable to vertical integration in the petroleum industry are the
transitory conditions. These conditions have arisen from the economic,
legal, and political circumstances prevailing at given stages in the his¬
tory of the industry.
The first transitory condition occurred in the period prior to 1911.
The Standard Oil Company, which was the dominant firm in the industry
during this period, stimulated many competitors to vertically integrate as
a means of escaping from its dominance, and as a means of effectively
competing with it. The Texas Company and Gulf Oil Corporation were among
the companies to become integrated during this period for the reasons
stated above.
After 1911, the increase in the demand for gasoline, brought about
by the rapid development of the automible, created a need for the establish¬
ment of a new system of distribution facilities, and many companies
^Ibid., pp, 666-667.
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integrated forward^ into marketing operations as a means for providing
outlets for gasoline distribution and as a means for capitalizing on
profit opportunities.
World War I created a condition "which motivated integration. It
caused a shortage of all petroleum products, and some companies integrated
backwards^ into crude oil production as a means of securing adequate crude
oil supplies.
From 1920-1935> because of "the large amount of crude oil supplies
which were thrown on "the market, new competition was created at the pro¬
ducing level, and caused some crude oil producers to integrate forward
into refining, marketing, and transportation activities as a means of secur¬
ing and assuring outlets for their production. This action on the part of
producers made it necessary for established refiners and marketers to in¬
tegrate their operations as a means of guarding their outlets from capture
by newcomers to the market.
The Excess Profits Tax, although temporary, and brought about by
World Wars I and II, created a transitory condition that made it desirable
for some companies to integrate backwards into production activities, and
after each war, because of shortages in the supply of petroleum products,
some companies again integrated backwards as a means of securing and pro¬
tecting their sources of supply.^
Not only have the general and transitory conditions been favorable
to vertical integration, but there has been relatively few serious obs"tacles
forward integration carries a company closer to the consumer.
2
Backward integration carries a company towards its raw materials.
^Ibid., pp. 667-669.
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to vertical integration. In the study made by McLean and Haigh, it was
found that in some industries where the business and economic reasons for
vertical integration have been almost persistent and powerful as in the
oil industry, relatively little vertical integration has ever taken place.
An examination of these industries revealed that they have been character¬
ized by major obstacles to vertical integration which have not been pres¬
ent in equal degree in the petroleum industry. An example of an industry
characterized by obstacles to the integration process is the textile in¬
dustry. The gains to be realized from vertical integration have been
recognized by economists and industry leaders, and through the years
textile companies have engaged in experimentation with various types of
integration, but these experiments have not proved to be successful. Some
of the more important reasons why the industry has not been receptive to
vertical integration are as follows:
1. The transportation activities require multi-purpose transpor¬
tation facilities, which are dependent upon the handling of a
wide variety of shipments for many different customers for
economical operation.
2. Retailing operations require a wide variety of fabric and
styles, which are too wide for any one company to undertake
on an economical basis.
3. Uniformity of supplies is difficult. A normal cotton plan¬
tation can serve only as a partial source of supply because
cotton is grown and prepared for market in a very large num¬
ber of different staple lengths, grades, and varieties. The
output from any one growing area generally falls into several
different categories and may vary considerably from one year
to the next, depending on crop conditions. Therefore, reliance
on the output of any single plantation or farm area cannot be
done, and supply is best assured from whatever source that
offers the best of the particular grade needed.
h. Style risks at the various manufacturing and distribution
levels. After fabrics leave the mills, they are usually dis¬
tributed into a large number of different markets, many of
which are susceptible to the influence of constantly chang¬
ing fashions, and require that a large number of items be
offered for customer selection.
25
5. Lack of financial resources to support integration programs.
The textile industry has been expanding at a slow rate, and
profits have been low in relation to those available in other
industries. The industry has long been regarded as one of
the "sick" industries in our economy.^
It can therefore be concluded that the vertically integrated struc¬
ture of the petrolevim industry will remain as long as the general and
transitory conditions as well as the absence of serious obstacles continue
to help make the economic climate favorable to it.
Vertical integration in the petroleum industry applies to small as
well as large companies. Many small congjanies are as fully integrated as
the large companiesj however, the larger companies, dominate the industry.
The twenty largest companies are classified as the majors, while the remain¬
ing companies are classified as the minors or independents. Exhibit IV
lists the major companies in the order of size as of 195U.
In the petroleum industry, the degree of efficiency from operations
for individual firms is largely dependent upon the depth of integration
and the size of the company. Companies which are vertically integrated
achieve greater stability from operations than those which are integrated
to a lesser extent or which aren't integrated at all,^ Each phase of
operation is dependent upon another phase for its activities. Vertical
integration is the means by which these activities are co-ordinated in a
systematic manner to reasonably assure uninterrupted operations.
The size of the individual firm in the petroleum industry is of
great importance. If a company is not of substantial size, it is more






TOTAL ASSETS OF MAJOR COMPANIES IN THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 19$k
Assets
1. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) • $6,6l5>000,000.00
2. Socony-Mobil Oil Company 2,257,000,000.00
3. Standard Oil Company of Indiana 2,187,000,000.00
U* Gulf Oil Corporation 1,969,000,000.00
5. Texas Company 1,9U6,000,000.00
6. Standard Oil Company of California ....... 1,678,000,000.00
7. Sinclair Oil Corporation . 1,187,000,000.00
8. Phillips Petroleum Company ..... 1,093,000,000.00
9. Cities Service Company .... 1,05U,000,000.00
10. Shell Oil Company .... 1,0U2,000,000.00
11. Atlantic Refining Company 612,000,000.00
12. Union Oil Company 511,000,000.00
13. Sun Oil Company 5,000,000.00
lU. Continental Oil Company »...•• 14.80,000,000,00
15. Pure Oil Comapny Ull,000,000.00
16. Tide Water Associated Oil Company. 396,000,000.00
17. Ohio Oil Company 325,000,000,00
18. Sunray Oil Company 300,000,000,00
19. Standard Oil Company of Ohio 295,000,000.00
20. Skelly Oil Company 292,000,000.00
Source; Harvey O'Connor, The Empire of Oil (New York, 1955), p, UO.
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Usually, the larger the size of the company, provided that it is integrated,
the greater the degree of operational efficiency.^
The optimal size of firms in the industry exists among the large
vertically integrated companies, which possess a high degree of efficiency.
2
According to the study of McLean and Haigh, the large vertically inte¬
grated firms experience a much higher rate of efficiency than the snaller
integrated and non-integrated firms.^
This study also shows that in 1950, vertically integrated firms
owned higher percentage of facilities as well as a higher proportion of
industry operations than the non-integrated firms. At every level of
operation, the vertically integrated companies dominated the facilities
and operations capacities, except at the producing level, and to a sub-
h
stantial degree, at the retail level.
At the production level of the industry, the study revealed that
the vertically integrated companies owned only 6.9 per cent of the drilling
rigs, 3U.8 per cent of the producing wells and 59.2 per cent of domestic
crude oil produced. These facts indicate that the average well of the
vertically integrated companies was far better than the average well of
the other companies, which is explained by the fact that the larger ver¬
tically integrated companies included in the study had a tendency to farm




This is a study of integrated oil companies through 1950 which in¬







likewise, turnover their very wells to stripper operators. The vertically
integrated companies owned 80.U per cent of the crude oil gathering and
trunk lines, while deliveries from these lines amounted to 81.9 per cent
of the industry.^
The vertically integrated companies owned 93*5 per cent of the re¬
fining capacity, and 92.8 per cent of the refinery runs. The thirty larg¬
est companies included in the survey had refining plants ranging in size
from 25,000 to 775jOOO barrels per day, with an average capacity of
190,000 barrels per day. The capacity of the smaller refineries ranged
from 100 to 25,000 barrels per day, and the average capacity was 5>000
barrels per day. The differences in total refining capacity was due to
the fact that the largest plants usually owned several plants, whereas the
smaller plants usually owned only one.
Also, it was noted that the larger companies accounted for 93*5 per
cent of the production of gasoline and naphthas, 91.6 per cent of the pro¬
duction of kerosene and distillates, and 9ii.l per cent of the residual fuel
J-
oil production. The production of specialty and miscellaneous product such
as ashphalt, waxes, and lubricating oils was substantially lower for the
vertically itegrated companies. The accounted for only 83.1 per cent of
production. This was due to the presence of a number of small and substan¬
tially non-integrated refiners specializing in certain products.
The above average yields of the above products reflect the fact that:
(l) the vertically integrated companies were somewhat better equipped with
cracking facilities than were the average plants in the industry; and (2)




almost exclusively on very heavy grades of crude oil which could only
produce a high hield of residual.
The per cent of products pipeline facilities controlled by the
vertically integrated companies was 90.8, and the percentage of products
delivered from these lines by the vertically integrated companies was 91*9*
The facts concerning refining operations show that the average re¬
finery of the vertically integrated companies ran at a higher level of
capacity than the average refineries of other companies in the industry.
This high level of operations reflects a gain in stability of operations,
resulting from extensive vertical integration.^
In the study, it was also found that at the wholesale level of
operations, the vertically integrated companies controlled 68,0 per cent
of the industry’s terminal and bulk plants, and 60.2 per cent of the ter¬
minal and bulk plant sales.
At the retail level, the vertically integrated companies owned or
leased 5l»U of the service stations in the industry while the volume of
gasoline sales through service stations owned or leased by these companies
was 57*8 per cent of the industry. This corroborates the general belief
in the industry that the average service station of the vertically inte¬
grated company is larger than the average station in the industry. At this
level, as in the production level, there are thousands of small independent
operators.^
On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that the optimal size
of firms in the oil industry and the most important types of companies are





of the facilities owned as well as the operations conducted at all levels
of the industry.
Although a high rate of efficiency from operations, is experienced
in the petroleum industry, over capacity is present at some levels of
operation.
The level of operations at which over capacity is more pronounced
is in refining. Because of technological advances made in refining, some
plants or certain portions of plants have beco^ obsolete, thereby creat¬
ing over capacity.^ Changes in refining operations have frequently oc¬
curred in the oil industry, and companies who are unable or unwilling to
keep abreast with these changes, find themselves with obsolete equipment.
In some instances, they are forced out of the business altogether. A
great number of refineries were constructed during periods when the finan¬
cial requirements were not very high. Also, many of these companies have
been closely held and of limited financial means. They have been and are
2
still vulnerable to changes caused by technological progress.
In some instances, even though technological advances in refining
operations have been made, many firms will operate their obsolete or semi-
obsolete refineries only during certain periods when the demand for certain
products is high. An example of this is the residual fuel oil, which has
a high demand during the fall and winter months, and a substantially lower
demand during periods of warm and hot weather. This type of operation is
carried on by firms called "in and outer” operators.
1 ]
Daniel C. Hamilton, Competition in Oil (Cambridge, 1958), p. lU2.
2
McLean, op, cit., p. 556.
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Some firms -which own more than one plant sometimes opera-be as the
"in and outer," but their obsolete or semi-obsolete equipment is put on
standby basis, and when the market is strong for a particular product it
will be put into operation.^
Over capacity exists in times of supply shortages. This situation
usually occurs for companies who have to purchase -their ci*ude oil from
outside firms. Being unable to secure the required amount of raw materials,
the company has idle capacity and is operating less than capacity.
In order to get a significant amount of efficiency from plant opera¬
tion, the refinery has to be operated at least at 75 per cent of capacity.
The high proportion of fixed and variable costs requires -that a refinery
p
be operated at or near capacity.
Over capacity also exists at the production level when a company or
operator exhausts a well.^ It can also exist when there is an overall short¬
age of supply. All operative levels are affected because idle capacity will
be crea-bed.
The petroleum industry is characterised by huge capital outlays. At
each level of operation the structure differs, thereby requiring different
capital outlays.
At the producing level, entry is fairly easy and inexpensive. This
can be witnessed ly the fact that in 1959, about 16,000 companies were in




Hamilton, op, cit., p. 85.
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Stewart Schackne and N. D'Arcy Drake, Oil For The World (New York,
i960), p. 125.
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production can range from practically nothing to a great deal of cash,
depending upon his drilling success and the various producing arrange¬
ments by which he may secure acreage and drilling funds.^ New firms can
also become established fairly expensively by acquiring acreage in new
fields where large companies overlook or are unable to lease all the prop¬
erties. Based on industry wide drilling expenses from 19UU through 195l>
a wildcatter entering the producing business with his personal funds would
2
be required to invest approximately $300,000.00 to find a new field.
Entry into the industry at the refining level is considerably dif¬
ferent from entrance at the production level. Economic barriers, largely
centered on capital requirements, sharply reduce the number of potential
entrants. The plant structure represents a specialized type of investment,
and the cost of constructing it is veiy high. The required investment in a
refining plant has become greater through the years as the optimal size
plant has increased because of technological advances made in refining
3
equipment and processes. The investment in a small modern refining plant
may range from one to several million dollars. According to McLean and
Haigh's study, in 1951, it would have been difficult to finance a modern
refinery with a capacity of 5,000 barrels per day for less than $3,000,000.00;
however, there have been times when refineries were financed for less than
$100,000.00 but these have been very small and poorly equipped.
1
These are various types of producing deals which are arrangements
that are negotiated primarily with small non-integrated producers. Through
these agreements, the producers have access to acreage as well as cash needed
for their operations. The more commonly known deals include farm outs, acre¬
age contributions, dry hole contributions, acreage purchase agreements, joint
interest wells, and combination deals.
2
McLean, op. cit., p. 522.
Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 87-89.
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A new competitor entering the refining business must not only have
a large amount of capital, but he must have the necessary technical know
how in the operations of the refining plant. He must have the technical
competency to deal with the intricate manufacturing process and the entire
range of problems which are encountered by refiners.^
Entry into a new market by refiners already established is not as
difficult as it is for a new competitor. The established refiner can ac¬
complish this by purchasing facilities in the new area; by establishing new
facilities in whole or in part in the new market area; or obtaining products
through trades and using independents to sell the merchandise. Entrance
into the new market can take place anytime the price level in an area is
O
attractive to the firm operating in another area.'^
The retail level is essentially and characteristically a field of
3
small scale enterprise; consequently entrance is relatively easy. This
easy to enter market may be disturbed at anytime by new competitors or by
established firms seeking to expand their marketing area.
The amount of capital required to establish marketing operations is
very small. In the study of McLean and Haigh, it was found that the capital
requirements for entering the retail market is not likely to exceed
$50,000.00.^
At this level, competition among rival concerns is very keen, and
McLean, op. cit., pp. 520-523.
2
Cassidy, op. cit., pp. 20-21,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Price Research in the Steel
and Petroleum Industries (New York, 1939), p. HXT
McLean, op. cit,, p. 523.
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new competitors seeking to enter the market will undoubtedly get resist-
ence from the established firms in the area because they know that their
share of the market may be decreased by the existence of the new competitor,
especially if he is offering a new type of service, such as self-service
stations. Yfhen competition reaches a point where price reductions began
to be made, it is possible that a price war will break out.
A price war is a market situation which comes about because of in¬
tensive price disturbances that develop out of the competitive struggle
for markets. In this situation, prices often decrease without any regard
to cost. Price wars are more common in gasoline distribution than in any
other distributive trade.^
Price wars are generally caused by one or more of the following
conditions:
1. general surplus of gasoline in one area that is disposed of in
another area where there isn't an oversupply.
2. oversupply of gasoline by one company which is disposed of by
sale to other refiners or by some sort of trading arrangement
3« importing of gasoline into an area by a low cost transportation
method
ho introduction of new factors into the market, such as new types
of gasoline dispensaries or new types of distribution outlets. 2
In the early stages of a price war, competitors are exercising normal
or near normal competitive behavior. Vendors are attempting to wrest busi¬
ness from the inroads or competitors. After methods of non-price competition
have been used to no avail, then sellers may offer discounts on gasoline to
regular customers. Some will offer discounts on purchases of all or some
Cassady, op. cit., p. 262,
^Ibid., p. 269.
35
products other than gasoline* Eventually, some sellers irill begin to sell
gasoline at moderate discounts openly. As more and more dealers reduce
prices on gasoline, price-cutting becomes more drastic, and finally, it
reaches a point where any action by one seller leads to a counteraction
by others. Prices sometimes are reduced to a level where they are below
cost.^
Price wars usually do not last indefinitely. In time, the sellers
and suppliers involved will terminate the war and the competitive activi¬
ties of each will be restored to the normal pre-war condition. Price wars
are usually terminated in the following ways:
1. the price Header or some strong factor in the market might
announce an increase in prices in its outlet.
2. the price leader or some strong factor in the market might
raise tank wagon prices or abandon existing dealer subsicfy
plan
3. the price leader or some strong factor in the market might
cut off supplies of one or more aggressive price competitors
U. representatives of the contending forces might get together
and come to some agreement.
Gasoline price wars are not planned. They are situations which
occur during the heat of everyday rivalry, and sellers must assume a cal¬
culated risk of becoming involved in them if they are to compete vigorously
to gain or to maintain a position in the market.
The impact of price wars is felt by all concerned (suppliers, whole¬
sale distributors, and retail dealers). Suppliers are hurt very little by
price wars because only a small portion of their business is affectedj how¬
ever, they come to the aid of the distributors and the dealers in times of
war because their businesses are greatly affected. The supplier not only
1
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furnishes the necessary supplies, but they guarantee the margins of both
distributors and dealers,^
The legality of participation by suppliers in price wars has been
tested in recent years; consequently, some companies have been required
to appear before the Federal Trade Commission and have had cases tried in
court concerning the matter of supplier participation in price wars. One
of the more recent cases was the Florida Case of 1961 which involved the
Sun Oil Con^jany. The Company gave discounts to a dealer who was in a
price war, and in an appearance before the Federal Trade Commission, it
was ruled that price wars were retail affairs and the company was not sell¬
ing at retail; however, later during the year, this case was brought to
court, and the court held that the competitors in the price war were the
Sun Oil Company and another oil company, and that the dealer was merely
2
a conduit through which Sun was competing for gas sales on a local level.
Gasoline price wars may break out at anytime in any given area, and
as stated previously, they affect all who are concerned. In most cases,
very little is accomplished by price wars, but they are welcome sights to
consumers who are afforded the opportunity to purchase gas at greatly re¬
duced prices at the expense of the price war participants.
^Ibid., pp. 277-280.
2
"Is Oil Company in Retail Trade,"
p. 92
Business Week. December 16, 1961,
CHAPTER III
THE ASHLAND OIL AND REFINING COMPANY
Its Beginning.—The Ashland Oil and Refining Company was incorpo¬
rated in Kentucky on October 31, 1936 as a consolidation of the Swiss Oil
Coiporation and its subsidiary, Ashland Refining Company. This consolida¬
tion came about mainly because of the death of Thomas Combs, president of
the Swiss Company in 1935, and because of the low market value of the
Swiss stock. In 1933, the value decreased from $5.00 to $1.00, while the
total assets had decreased from $3,38U,519.07 in 1922 to $2,225,000.00 in
1933. Another factor which led to the consolidation was the passage of a
Kentucky law in 1936 which would have increased the taxes of the two com¬
panies if they had remained separate.
The Swiss Oil Corporation was incorporated in June, 1918 as a
Kentucky corporationj participating only in the production phase of the
industry. In January 192li, the Swiss Company organized the Ashland Re-
fing Company.^ From the very beginning, this company maintained a favor¬
able location, an expansion of diversified lines of products, low manu-
P
facturing and overhead costs, and an increased gasoline yield.
In I92U, when the company purchased a small refining plant in Cat-
lettsburg, Kentucky, near the Ohio River, it gained a transportation advan¬
tage over its competitors. The plant was removed from any large refining
center, an economic supply of crude oil was available because the refinery
I




•was connected by pipeline "to the oil fields of Eastern Kentucky, and
refined products could be mo-ved inexpensi-vely on the Ohio River, An¬
other transportation advantage was that the refinery was situated at
the intersection of two railroads where products could be transported
by railway -tank cars.^
Most of Ashland's operations were concentrated within the states
of Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia and its refined products included
gasoline, naphtha, kerosene, fuel oil, and gas oil. The low manufactur¬
ing and overhead costs of refining these products resul'ted from small
changes in the operation of the refineries which were made from time to
time as the situation demanded. Even though the refining equipment used
by the Ashland Refining Company was, in most cases, considered obsolete,
it was used to a great extent, and the company was able to increase the
efficiency of operations primarily through attaining output always in ex-
2
cess of capacity,
^ 1930, the company had acquired another plant and was running
about i;500 barrels of crude oil per day to two refineries in Catlettsburg,
Kentucky and Kenova, West Virginia, The gasoline output was marketed under
several different brand names within a radius of 150 miles surrounding the
plants. A large portion of the other products were delivered by a fleet
of trucks operating within a fifty mile radius of the refineries, an area
where the company had a transportation advantage over competitors. Gaso¬
line and other products of the refineries were sold through owned and
leased bulk plants, and service stations under contract.
1 —
McLean, op. cit,, p. 639*
2
Massie, op. cit., pp. 52-5U,
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Several million gallons of refined products were also sold annually to
some large companies which found that it was more economical to purchase
refined products from Ashland for local distribution in the area than it
was to transport refined products from distant refineries.^
The Ashland Refining Company operated successfully even during the
Depression years. This growth continued until October 31» 1936 when it
Was consolidated with the Swiss Oil Corporation to form the Ashland Oil
2
and Refining Company.
In 1937# new oil fields were discovered in Illnois. This served
as a stimulant for the company to not only extend its refining operations,
but to integrate forward into marketing, and to expand its own producing
activitiesj however, it wasn't until 19i;2 that the company extended its
operations into exploration and development to any great degree. Most of
the crude oil requirements had been purchased from independent producers.
When the company did embark on its producing program, in order to average
out some of the risks involved in the exploration and development of cinide
oil, it joined with independent producing companies and in so doing, the
cnide oil supply of the refineries was greatly increased. Ey exploring
and developing jointly, the company not only saved money, but it had the
assistance of experienced specialists whose organizations were adapted
3
to the problems of e^qjloration and development of crude oil.
The company began a modernization program in 1938 by purchasing a
1 ■
McLean, op. cit., p. 639.
2




distillation unit and a small polymerization plant, and in an attempt to
keep abreast with the octane race, in 1939, which was initiated by the
introduction of a new catalytic cracking process, the company also re¬
modeled its plant in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, and dismantled an old re¬
finery which had been built in 1925. Parts of this refinery were used
in the remodeling of the cracking plant. These improvements not only
increased capacity, but achieved better balance, decreased the number of
shut downs, and improved the quality of gasoline.^
By I9U0, the company was shipping refined products from its Cat¬
lettsburg refinery to terminals on the Ohio River spaced between Louisville,
Kentucky and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Refined products were moved to
local markets from the river terminals and from the refinery by tank trucks
2
and railway tank cars.
As the Ashland Oil and Refining Company began to grow and as the
petroleum industry continued its growth, various problems arose. In order
to combat these problems successfully, the managements of the companies had
to be flexible and capable of adjusting to the situations that the problems
presented.
The problems which came about during the period, 19UO-1955 were as
follows:
1. the Governmental problem
2. the foreign oil dilemma
3. World War II
U. the postwar demand increase




McLean, op. cit., pp. 639-6U0.
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The Governmental Problem.—Throughout the years, the Government,
through Congress, the Deparlanent of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission,
the District Courts and the Supreme Court, and the National Recovery Ad¬
ministration, has attempted to regulate the oil industry. The Supreme
Court decree of 1911 against the Standard Oil Company was among the first
attempts at regulation of the industry. The Clayton Act of 19llt was another.
It forbade exclusive dealing contracts by which the independent jobber and
retailer were tied to the major supplier. In 1929> the Federal Trade Com¬
mission issued a voluntary measure, the Code of Fair Practices which spelled
out the conditions of marketing, and the National Recovery Administration
in 1933 issued other codes which were voluntary; however, these codes seemed
to be of little value because they could not legally be enforced.
In 1935> important governmental regulatory measures came into ex¬
istence. These measures affected the cmide oil production activities of
all petroleum companies, and are known as the prorationing and conservations
laws. Prorationing is administered by the various oil producing states,^
who set the allowable limit on the crude oil production of each state. The
allowable limits are based upon an estimate of the potential market demand
2
for petroleum products, which is determined by the Bureau of Mines.
These laws affected the operations of all companies in the oil in¬
dustry in that the crude oil production has been limited, and the price of
crude oil has become somewhat stabilized.
^here are 2h oil producing states in this country. The major ones
are Texas, California, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Kansas, and Illinois. These
states produce approximately ninety per cent of the total oil produced in
the United States.
2
Rostow, op. cit., pp. 3U~35.
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During most of its history, the Ashland Oil and Refining Company
has primarily been a refining company, althou^ in recent years, it has
become fully integrated. The problem it was confronted with after pro¬
rationing came into existence was the securing of an adequate supply of
crude oil for refining operations. The fact that a major persentage of
the crude oil supply has been owned by integrated companies has minimized
the amount available to the non-integrated refiner. Before prorationing,
the company had very few problems in attaining the required crude oil for
operations. Locating the sources of supply was relatively easy, and the
chances of getting caught in a refiners "price squeeze" were minimized,
because the risks involved were counter-balanced by the maintenance of
close working agreements with independent producers, and the ability to
take advantage of low priced crude oil in times of overproduction.
After prorationing came into existence, the price of crude oil
became higher and more stabilized^ With this relatively constant cost,
any decline in the price of refined products has caused a serious decline
in refining margins and has made stable and profitable operations difficult
for the non-integrated refiner.^
As a partial solution to the supply problems, Ashland improved trans¬
portation facilities through both pipelines and towboats. It obtained its
greatest security through the ownership of gathering pipelines and the
collection of oil at the wellhead and transporting it on towboats.^




backwards through purchases of producing properties from time to time. Most
of the acquisitions were marginal wells which produced very small quantities
of cmde oil per day, and which were purchased at very reasonable prices.
The price of crude oil has a direct effect on iriiether the wells are worked,
and the amount of attention necessary to run these wells makes them un¬
attractive to large producers. The development of newer methods of second¬
ary recovery, by water flooding, has made this program more attractive in
recent years, and Ashland has gained valuable experience in the unique as¬
pects of profitably operating such marginal properties, which have a poten¬
tial value for secondary recovery.^
During the period 19iiO-1955> many small companies of the petroleum
industry began to complain to the government about unfair practices of some
large companies. In an effort to curtail the actions of these companies,
the Department of Justice leveled indictments at firms involved in these un¬
fair practices. Among the more important court cases which occurred during
this period were the Socony-Vacuum Case, the Ethyl Case, and the Offshore
Oil Cases.
The Socony-Vacuum Oil Company was indicted in 1936, but it was 19Ul
before the compaqy was convicted. Socony, along with other companies
operating in the Mid-continent area, was charged with fixing and maintaining
gasoline jobbing margins, and adopting uniform jobber contracts and jobber
dealing policies. Twenty-three companies and forty-six individuals were
involved in this case. Indictments against four companies and thirty
p
individuals were dismissed and the remainder were convicted.
^Ibid., pp. 8U-85.
p
^Cassady, op. cit., p. 3U2,
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The area affected included UOOO jobbers, most of whose products
came from twelve major companies operating in the area. These jobbers
greatly resisted this action by the companies, and appealed to Congress
and other governmental agencies* Some congressmen and state legislatures
began to demand divorcement^ of the distiributive and retail phases of
2
industry operations from the other phases.
In the Ethyl case, the Ethyl Corporation, which was indicted in
I9U0, held patents on a fluid which increased the octane of gasoline, and
which took the knock out of motors. This fluid was manufactured by Ethyl
and sold directly to refiners, both large and small, through requirement
contracts which bound the purchasing refiners not to sell the combined
product (mixture of the fluid with gasoline) to anyone other than licensed
refiners, approved jobbers, approved retail dealers, or to consumers.
Clauses in the sales contract prescribed various conditions on •which job¬
bers would be denied licenses to handle the fluid. These conditions re¬
quired that certain health regulations be followed} "that merchants not
participate in price competition} that "the gasoline which contained the
fluid be sold at two cents a gallon above regular gasoline} and that if a
■3
change in suppliers took place, a new contract was required.-'^
^Some government officials and state legislatures have for many years
been in favor of and ha-ve promoted the idea of divorcement of our four phases
of operations in the petroleum industry. The opponents contend that the only
way to solve the problems which the minor firms of the industry are confronted
with is through divorcement, making each di-vision independent of one anotter}
thereby making entry easier and making the industry a competitive one rather
than monopolistic.
2




Ethyl -was charged with conspiring to restrain interstate commerce
in gasoline by means of an illegal licensing scheme.^
The coii5)any’s defense was that sales contracts were reasonably
adapted to its primary and legitimate purpose of making as much money as
possible from its patents, and to its legitimate purpose of protecting
its trade name and reputation by enforcing health regulations in the use
of the fluid, and preserving a suitable price differential for the high
test gasoline containing its fluid.
The Court upheld an injunction against continued use of the re¬
stricted contract terms, and held that the power to exclude persons from
dealing in Ethyl treated gasoline could not be exercised in the interest
of maintaining the price of untreated gasoline, nor the resale of treated
gasoline.^
The two cases cited, although they were important victories for the
Department of Justice, did not effect any important changes in the price
behavior of the industry, because Ethyl gasoline still sells at two cents
more than regular gasoline,”^ and in 1955, as in previous years, jobbers
were still protesting over margins and were filing complaints with the
Department of Justice and in federal courts.^
Neither of the cases cited affected the operations of Ashland Oil
and Refining Company to a great extent, but during this period the purchase
of the manufactured fluid from the Ethyl Corporation was a factor in helping
^Cassady, op. cit., p. 3U2.
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Rostow, op. cit., p. 85.
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Cassady, op. cit., p. 226.
^Ibid., p. 122.
the company maintain a competitive position in octane ratings. Ashland
was among the first companies to purchase the fluid,^
Although most of Ashland's operations were in Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Ohio, it had limited activities in parts of the Mid-Continent area
(Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan), The Company developed its own sales
organization which called directly on independent jobbers, and most of the
sales were made through these jobbers. It had a uniform pricing policy
which provided for the same price on the same quality of gasoline to all
wholesale buyers in a given area. In time, the Company gained the confi-
2
dence of the independent jobbers.
Prices in the Mid-Continent area were determined by the price leader
or other large companies operating in the area. In Chio, it was the Standard
Cil Company (Chio), in Kentucky, it was the Standard Oil Company of Kentucky;
in West Virginia, it was the Standard Cil Company (New Jersey); in New York,
the Socony-Vacuum Cil Company; and in Indiana and Illinois, Standard Oil
Company (Indiana),
Ashland has always operated in areas where these large companies had
a part in establishing prices, and it frequently adjusted its activities to
conditions established by these large companies. The characteristics of
these adjustments made it possible for the company to remain insignificant
in the area of each large marketer, and therefore, to avoid some of the
threats of retaliation that might have resulted from attracting too much
attention by a large increase in volume in any single area,^




Another governmental attempt at regulation of the oil industry was
the ownership of offshore oil.
The question of ownership rights to offshore oil^ did not arise until
1933* Tl^hen the issue was put to Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes,
he said that the states owned the land and had a right to lease themj how¬
ever, in 1937, the Senate, by a unanimous vote, passed a joint resolution
giving ownership of the offshore lands to the federal government and directed
the Department of Justice to file suits against intruders. The resolution
was adopted by a House of Representatives Committee, but it never reached
the floor of the House itself. President Roosevelt asked that these lands
be set aside as a naval reserve, but no action was taken. Before any
further federal action was taken, the country was in the midst of World War
II.^
During the latter part of 19U5> the Senate and the House of Repre¬
sentatives voted to confirm that the rights to offshore oil belonged to the
states, but President Truman vetoed it. In 19U6, the Department of Justice
began preparing to file a suit against California for title to offshore oil,
and during January, 19^7, it filed this suit. In June of the same year, the
Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had paramount rights in
California's offshore lands, and in 19U8, after suits had been filed against
Texas and Louisiana, the Supreme Court again ruled that the government had
3
paramount rights in the offshore lands. This decision was reversed in
1 —
Offshore oil is that oil which is found off the coasts of California,
Louisiana, and Florida.
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195U when the court held that title to these lands belonged to the states.
These court decisions involving the ownership rights to offshore oil
had very little if any affect in the operations of the Ashland Oil and
fining Compary because most of its crude oil requirement was secured from
states operating in or near the Mid-Continent area. These states were
Kentucky, Illinois, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
These decisions were of concern to Ashland in that throughout its
history it has disliked the idea of governmental control, even though it
was the type of con5)any that the government sought to help.
Ashland consistently fought efforts of the government in its attempt
to regulate the industry. The management felt that many of the formal tech¬
niques employed in government did not fit administrative experiences of the
small company. In a letter to the Board of Directors in 1933, Paul Blazer,
President of Ashland stated: "Our company has less to gain and more to fear
than others from this regimentation of the industry." It was Blazer's be¬
lief that "Ashland's advantages were based upon a unique group of factors
which would be neutralized in any governmental effort to stabilize or regu¬
late the industry. A small growing company should not seek to freeze a
pattern in which it has a small share.As Ashland continued to grow, so
did this attitude. This was indicated by Blazer in a speech to the Ohio
Petroleum Marketers Association on September 20, 1950: "Federal control
and regulation may be forced upon us because of our own lack of leadership,
^American Petrolevim Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures (New York.
1959), P. h.
lassie, op. cit., p. 185
3.
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but I can't understand irhy an individual or group should voluntarily ask
for such disaster.
The management of Ashland always took an aggressive part in the
fight of the minors against the majors, but it preferred to emphasize
direct competition rather than appeals to the Courts or to Congress.
When Blazer testified before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee on July lU* 1953» what he said in effect, supported the inter¬
ests of the major companies. He explained the factors involved in price
increases of crude oil in support of the position of the integrated pro¬
ducers, even though the increase proved detrimental to the interests of
Ashland Oil,^ .
The Foreign Oil Dilemma.—^Virtually all of the oil imported into
the United States is produced by American oil companies from concessions
they possess in foreign countries, and although imported oil has played
and is still playing an important role in the operations of the petroleum
industry as well as our economy, during certain periods it has helped to
create problems for the large and small domestic companies. These problems
exist when there is an excess supply of crude oil and refined products.
When an excess supply of crude oil and refined products exists, crude
oil production is further limited through prorationing, the price of refined
products as well as crude oil is reduced, thereby decreasing the profit mar¬
gins of producers and refiners, and it creates hard competition at the re¬
fining, wholesale, and retail levels, because firms will be seeking new




assuring outlets for their products.
Foreign oil participation by American companies has mainly been that
of the large companies,^ because the risk and cost involved have been much
too great for the smaller companies. The risks and costs involved have been
so great until some of the large companies operating in foreign countries
have combined their efforts in order to minimize the risks and costs. These
join ventures not only occur between American owned companies, but they also
occur between American and foreign companies. An example is, the Iraq
Petroleum Company -which is jointly owned by British, Dutch, French, and
2American interests.
The governmental attitude concerning imports has been a fluctuating
one, which has usually been keyed to changes in the domestic oil supply posi¬
tion. During the 1920's during the postwar period, when there was a short
supply of oil, imports were strongly encouraged. When the supplies were
abundant during the 1930's restrictions were applied on imports. From the
early 19U0's through 1955, restrictions were eased, and the amount of im-
ported oil began to increase.^ In 19U0, imports were 5*9 per cent of the
total domestic production.^ ^ 1955 they had climbed to nearly l5 per cent
1
Foremost among American companies operating in foreign countries
are Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Gulf Oil Corporation, the Texas
Company, Shell Oil Company, and Standard Oil Company of California.
2
Leonard M. Fanning, American Oil Operations Abroad (New York, 19U7),
pp. 37-39.
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of total domestic production.
In I9U7, for the first time since 1920, the domestic demand for
petroleum products exceeded the supply, and imported oil had to supply
the required balance to meet the demand. By 19U9> the industry had be¬
gun eaqseriencing oversupply problems, and a surplus of petroleum as well
2
as crude oil existed.
Large and small domestic companies who were affected by this over¬
supply condition began filing complaints with governmental agencies for
curtailment of imports. The domestic producing companies complained that
most of the domestic supply was ’’shut in," and that if their wells were
allowed to produce, there would be no need for imports. The number of
3
producing days allowed in Texas dropped from 291 in 19U9 to 19l4- in 1951;•
The Independent Refiners Association argued that the increasing
imports of residual fuel oil threatened to eliminate the independent re¬
finer, and that the smaller refineries could not afford to match the price
of this oilj consequently, they were forced to install expensive equipment
to split their own residual oil into more marketable products or go out of
k
business.
The low cost of crude oil was a main advantage of the importing
companies. The Department of Commerce estimated in 19l;6 that Arabian crude
oil cost thirty cents a barrel, and that Venezuelan crude oil cost fifty
^O'Connor, op. cit., p. 2l5.
2
Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., op. cit., p. 28.
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cents a barrel, while Gulf Coast and Texas crude oil cost $1.85 and $1.65
respectively,^
This excess supply condition also had its effect upon the Ashland
Oil and Refining Company. The company had begun a program of re-emphasiz¬
ing exploration and development in 1950, and by 195U, because of its crude
oil purchasing policies and because of the large amount of crude oil and
petroleum products on the market, it was faced with the problem of cutting
off its source of supply of crude oil, and of adjusting operations to man¬
ufacture products which were most profitable.
The policy of Ashland during this period was to purchase most of its
crude oil requirement from independent producers. The threat of inability
to secure a sufficient supply of crude oil made it desirable to maintain
excess supplies. During periods of oversupply, the company purchased all
the crude oil available, and in periods of short supply, it sometimes had
2
to pay a premium in order to secure the required amount for operations.
By purchasing most of its crude oil from producers, Ashland could
not control the supply, and after it had purchased a sufficient amount of
crude oil, it faced the problem of cutting off the source of supply, but
because of the structure of crude oil markets, it was difficult to do this.
The reputation of the buyer in the oil fields was most important when crude
oil was scarce, and irhen the buyer was dependent upon independent operators
for a large share of his supply. Once a buyer refused to purchase the
3
supplier's oil, it was difficult to obtain oil from the supplier again,
^Ibid., p, 221.
2
Massie, op. cit., p. 133.
^Ibid., p. 135.
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In July, 1951i, crude oil had become so plentiful, and the company
had obtained such a large supply until it had become a problem. The sit¬
uation was explained by Paul Blazer, President, in a letter to the Board:
'niife have a crude oil supply that is so large that it is burdensome. It
is almost as difficult to cut off crude oil supply as to increase it when
additional supplies are needed. We buy approximately 65»000 barrels per
day of oil direct from producers on lease division orders."^
The company also complained that it had been caught in a squeeze
between the wholesale market and fixed prices of the crude oil that it
bought. It said that through severe prorationing of production, which was
aggravated by the importation of low cost crude oil, the prices of domestic
2
crude oil had become stabilized.
The refining flexibility of the company proved to be of great value
during this period of excess supply. The refinery yield was continually
adjusted to decrease the manufacture of products with weak market demands,
and increase those with stronger market demands. An exanple of this flexi¬
bility occurred in 19U9 when the price of residual fuel oil decreased by
fifty per cent. The refinery yield was shifted to a point where the amount
of residual fuel oil manufactured was reduced to approximately two per cent
of a barrel of oil. As a result, Ashland’s earnings from its refining
operations suffered much less than many companies in the industry.^




O'Connor, op. cit., p. 221.
3
McLean, op. cit., p. 658.
an amendment to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955^ which granted
the President authority to adjust imports whenever he finds reason to be-
2
lieve that they threaten to jeopardize the nation’s security.
World War II.—The most significant problem of the period was World
War II. Its effects were felt not only in the oil industry, but by the
entire economy. The war brought about an increase in the activities at all
levels of the oil industry. Between 19Ul and 19U5> nearly seven billion
barrels of oil were produced and refined into more than five hundred petro¬
leum products. A total of 13,1|00 wells were drilled, and crude oil produc-
tion increased by 1,U00,000 barrels daily.
A large amount of the increased activity at the production level was
influenced by the Excess Profits Tax. This tax was created during World
War I, and was enacted chiefly because of large war profits that threatened
to affect the morale of the community, especially the wage earning group.
The extensive control on wages and consumption during World War II could
presumably not have been accepted in the United States in the absence of an
excess profits tax. The Excess Profits Tax was a tax on the excess of the
actual profit of an accounting period over a standard of profit. The rate
ranged from 25 to 35 per cent in 19ii0. In 19UU, it was increased to 90 per
1 ~~ ^
This act was originally passed in 193U, and had been amended several
timesj however, the basic purpose of it is to keep the imports of the var¬
ious products at a level where they will not cause or threaten serious in¬
jury to the domestic industry producing con^ietitive products.
2
Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., op. cit., pp. 28-29.
3
United States Department of the Interior, A History of the Petro-
leum Administration for War (Washington, 19i4.6), p. 1.
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cent, with 10 per cent returnable at the end of the war.
Ashland, like most of the firms in the oil industry, had earnings
subject to excess profit taxes. Faced with this problem, it embarked on
an intensified program of exploration and development of crude oil. Funds
that otherwise would have been paid in taxes were spent in this explora-
. 2
tion and development program.
Competition was exceedingly keen; nevertheless, in 19^3* the com¬
pany drilled lU6 wells of which ninety-nine proved to be productive. Oil
production increased by 176 per cent from 2,122 barrels per day in 19U2
to 5^865 per day in 19U3. Exploration activities continued until 19U8, at
3
which time the production had increased to 10,12U barrels per day.
Following the shortage of petroleum products during 19U7 and 19li8,
the industry experienced a sharp and rapid change, ^y the middle of 19U9»
there was an oversupply of crude oil, and the Excess Profits Tax was no
longer a factor. As a result of these changes, and because the backward
integration into production had proven to be unprofitable, Ashland began
to de-emphasize production activities, iihich showed a net loss of more
than a million dollars.^
The backward integration into production activities by Ashland dur¬
ing this period was caused almost entirely by the Excess Profits Tax.
Prospects for profits from cnide oil did not appear as attractive to the
Encyclopedia Brittannica, Inc., Encyclopedia Brittannica, 1951
Edition, VIII, 9U6-9i;7.
2






management as prospects in the other branches, especially refining and
transportation. Although the crude oil supply had been considered im¬
portant by other managements who had expanded their exploration activ¬
ities, the management of Ashland felt that it never had any real trouble
in securing enough crude oil, even in times of extreme shortages. How¬
ever, because the price of crude oil was an important factor in determin¬
ing the price of refined products, the fluctuations in refining margins
continued to be difficult for the company. In this situation, the manage¬
ment considered flexibility the important counterbalancing force. Many
of the difficulties, the management thought, could be overcome through
several defensive matters such as; (l) shifting the purchases of crude
oil to places more economically located for operations; (2) shifting the
yield of refined products to those products whose prices were more stable
and which showed the least downward pressure; and (3) pay closer attention
to refining costs as a means of compensating for an unfavorable differential
in the purchase price of crude oil.^
Severe supply shortages began occurred during the early stages of
the war after enemy submarines attacked United States ocean tankers trans¬
porting oil from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast; thereby, cutting off
the main source of supply for the East. Prior to the war, tankers from
the Gulf Coast supplied the East with 95 per cent of its crude oil and
petroleum products requirements.^ Other means of transportation were
^Ibid., pp. 91-92.
2
United States Department of the Interior, op cit., pp. 87-88.
3
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), The Lamp (New York. 1957).
p. 35.
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devised; however, it was never possible to rebuild the stock of the East
to a safe operating level throughout the war.^
Not only did -ttie East experience severe supply shortages, but even¬
tually because of the ever increasing demand requirements of the armed
forces, which drained the domestic oil reserves, an overall shortage of
petroleum products existed. Later, during the war, this shortage, coupled
with the nation-wide rubber shortage, made it necessary to ration gasoline
2
in the consumer market for the duration of the war.
Rationing of gasoline in the consumer market caused the sale of more
than half of Ashland's throughput to the government. Marketing policies
were controlled by governmental regulations, which made it impossible for
the company to continue its own marketing techniques,'^
Because of this governmentally-controlled system during this period,
Ashland placed only a small percentage of total capital expenditures into
mairketing. It will be noted on Exhibit V that approximately five per cent
of total Capital expenditures were placed into marketing in 19U2, and in the
next three succeeding years, the percentage decreased to about one per cent
each year.
The problem of transportation came about early during the war when
ocean tankers enroute to the East Coast with crude oil and petroleum products
were sunk. Other means of transportation had to be devised. Railroads ran
' long trains of tank cars at express speeds from the Gulf Coast, and some
companies even shipped oil in drums loaded into box cars, but this still did
not supply the East Coast with a sufficient amount of oil. Eight major oil
I ’
United States Department of the Interior, op, cit,, p. 88.
^Ibid,. pp. 121-122.





























companies, in 19l;2, urged the construction of a giant pipeline,^ and in
I9U3, the "Big Inch" pipeline was constructed. This pipeline was a crude
oil line, and was twenty-four inches in diameter. It covered 125U miles
from Longview, Texas to Linden, New Jersey, and was the largest pipeline
in the world.
Shortly after the construction of the "Big Inch" pipeline, the
"Little Big Inch" products pipeline was constructed. This line was twenty
inches in diameter, and it stretched from Beaumont, Texas to Seymour, Indiana
a distance of 11^75 miles. This pipeline was the longest in the United States
During the remaining years of the war, these giant pipelines helped
to supply many million barrels of crude oil and refined products to the
2
stricken East Coast.
Construction of these lines were of great concern to the management
of Ashland Oil and Refining Company. Both of the pipelines were routed
through the company’s market area, and the management feared that at the
end of the war, they would be used by competitors to transport crude oil
and petroleum products into the area at a much cheaper rate than the com¬
pany could. The localized nature of Ashland's marketing territory made it
3
vulnerable to a decrease in competitors transportation cost in the area.
Prior to the completion of the pipelines in 19U3, Blazer, who was a leader
in opposing the route of these lines, in a comment to the Board said: In
addition to the 2k inch pipeline now being built from Texas to the East
Coast, which we consider a serious threat to the profitability of our postwar
1 ^ —
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), op. cit., p. 35.
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operation, it now appears that the same group will construct for the
account of the Defense Plant Corporation, a 20 inch line from the vi¬
cinity of Houston on the Gulf Coast to the Eastern Seaboard. There is
considerable controversy between the major companies who are sponsoring
the line as to whether it will parallel the first or come up through
Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia, passing with a five miles of our
plant. The seriousness of this threat will be realized when it is ex¬
plained that the new line will transport gasoline from Texas into this
area at a cost of not exceeding one-fourth cents a gallon whereas the
present prevailing price at Texas refineries is approximately one and
one-half cents a gallon lower than the price of f.o.b. our refinery. It
is easily conceivable that this pipeline built at government expense may
completely destroy the refining industry in this general area after the
war. Texas has large reserves of crude oil which can be produced at a
lower cost than can be produced in any other area. I have no solution
for the problem confronting us which you can be assured will be the most
important factor determining our plans for the future."^
Near the end of the war. Blazer took the initiative in promoting
the use of the pipelines for the transportation of natural gas in place
of crude oil or refined products. This initiative was expressed in the
form of a testimony in congressional hearings concerning the matter, and
following the end of the war, these two gigantic pipelines, which had cost






In planning for the future, Ashland began to make preparations for
an aggressive sales and expansion program during the postwar period, and
during this period, as discussed later, it experienced tough competition
from large coicpanies who owned large diameter pipelines.
World War II created problems in manpower for most industries.
During the early months of the way, the petroleum industry did not exper¬
ience any serious manpower problems, but during the latter months of 19U2,
it began to feel the effect of manpower losses. Later during the war, be¬
fore the shortages could cause ary damaging effects upon operations of the
various companies in the industry, some draftees in critical areas, such as
refining, were granted discharges from the armed services. Also, in order
to meet the demand requirements of the war, some companies established the
p
ii8 hour week.
During the war, Ashland, like most companies in the industry had a
manpower shortage, with the number of employeees held to a minimum; however,
with the increased capacity in company owned facilities, and the stabliza-
tion of the industry by governmental control, the management of the company
was able to delegate a great amount of authority to subordinates. The ex¬
perience gained by most of these employees enabled them to become adjusted
to larger scale operations. This was advantageous to the company because
of its increase in size in the period immediately prior to and during the
3war.-^
Americana Corporation, The Encyclopedia Americana, 1957 Edition,
mi, p. 111.
United States Department of Interior, op. cit., p. 290.
3
-"Massie, op. cit., p. 76.
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The Postwar Demand Increase for Petroleum Products.—In the period
following the war, an increase in consumer demand for petroleum products
took place. This high demand was the result of heavy motor travel and
transport, high industrial production, the increasing use of oil in agri¬
culture and for home heating, conversions from coal to oil as a source of
industrial and railroad power, and continued use of petroleum and petro¬
leum products by the United States Military Forces.^
This demand increase came at a time when the industry was still
struggling under the effects of a rigidly controlled wartime economy. Be¬
cause of the war, it had been deprived of steel and other essential materials
2
required for plant expansion. The construction, in time, of needed new
3facilities in all operating activities was a major problem of the industry.
Most companies in the industry began to expand facilities as well as market¬
ing areas in an effort to meet the increased demand.
By 19h7f the consumer demand for petroleum products had reached a
point where it exceeded supply. It was then necessary to increase imports
in order to keep pace with the growing consumer demand for petroleum prod¬
ucts. Most of the imported oil came from Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, and
the Middle East.^
During 19h9t the substantial completion of postwar expansion in the
industry had taken place. Over a three-year period, six billion dollars
^Standard Oil Con^jany (New Jersey), Annual Report, for year ending
December 31, 19U6, p. U.
2
Pure Oil Company, Annual Report, for year ending December 31, 19li7,
p. 7.
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had been spent by firms in the indastiy to make the necessary facilities
available to serve the rapidly growing requirements of the consumers and
to build up the inventory,^
Ashland did not feel the effects of the increased demand for petro¬
leum products until the summer of 19U7 when it became evident that oil
products were going to be in short supply. Sven though the supply of crude
oil remained tight through 19U7 and 19li6» Ashland was able to obtain ample
supplies, and expand the manufacture of those products in shortest supply.
Ihe small centrally controlled organization was able to adjust its opera-
2
tions quickly to meet this special demand situation.
During this period of short supply, crude oil was obtained by barges
from areas not serviced by pipelines. Also during this period, the company's
exploration and development program had increased the gross production of
crude oil to 10,121; barrels daily, but this had been curtailed because of
a shortage of steel and of good drilling areas.
In 19U7, the company, in search for additional crude oil, and with
a renewal interest in additional crude oil production, looked to the Middle
East for oil. Because of the lai^e expenditures required and the risks in¬
volved, Ashland along with seven other independent firms organized the
American Independent Oil Company. This joint venture was of lar^e help dur¬
ing the period because it was six years before oil was discovered in Warfa
field in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone.^
I ;
Pure Oil Company, Annual Report, for year ending, December 31, 19U9.
p. 10.
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Massie, op. cit., p. 52.
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Ihe Amurex Oil Development Company, which was organized by Ashland
and another independent company in 1951, is another example in which Ash-
land looked to foreign oil in the expansion of crude oil producing
program; however, this company failed to discover much oil, but American
Independent was successful,^
The Korean War in 1950 changed the outlook for crude oil and again
introduced the factor of the excess profits tax. An oil field discovered
in West Texas appeared to show real promise for the conpany. Extreme dif¬
ficulties involved in bringing the expected volume of oil to the surface,
necessitated a write down of assets by $b,500,000.00 in 1953. So Ashland
2
again de-emphasized its exploration and development activities.
Although Ashland experienced considerable difficulty at the produc¬
tion level during this postwar period, the refinery location at Catlettsburg
was particularly advantageous, especially during 19ii7 and 19Uy when the in¬
dustry faced the shortage of oil. At this time, there was less competition
from other competitors because the more distant refiners tended to concen¬
trate their selling efforts in the more profitable areas surrounding their
own plants.
After World War II, Ashland inaugurated a major expansion program
in which seven small refineries were acquired. These refineries were located
at various points from Buffalo, New York to St. Elmo, Illinois, and each was
in a position to adequately serve its immediate locality at low transporta-
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plants and products pipelines to extend their marketing areas or to re¬
duce costs, Ashland depended upon the advantages of small local refinery
supply points to enlarge its marketing territory.”^
In an effort to expand its marketing area to meet the increasing
demand and to promote its products, Ashland experienced competition from
large operators with large diameter pipelines. In this situation, it had
five possible choices pertaining to transportation. It could (1) cooper¬
ate with others and build and operate jointly a large inch pipeline, (2)
expand total volume within a restricted market area in order to be able to
efficiently operate a pipeline of its own, (3) find some other means of
transportation that would enable it to enter a market on a competitive
basis with oil transported ty pipeline, (U) to use common carrier pipe-
lines,^ or (5) specialize in refined products not adaptable to mass trans¬
portation by pipelines,^
In the period immediately after the war, Ashland continued to rely
heavily on its river equipment for transportation. Towboats were super¬
charged and modified to carry larger loads, and additional terminals were
added to strengthen the company's marketing position.
After a series of mergers from 19Ub--1950, the company had increased
its transportation system tremendously. In this short period, the coirpany
acquired ten ocean tankships, more than 1563 miles of gathering and trunk
lines, thirty-three railroad tank cars and a large fleet of tank trucks.
1 —
Ibid., p. 6l4l.
^Common carrier pipelines are subject to regulations by the Inter¬
state Commerce Commission, and are available for use by all oil companies
in transporting crude oil or refined products.
3
Massie, op. cit.. p. 119.
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Bie transportation system Jiad grown to such an extent by 1951 that
the net investments in transportation facilities were greater than net in¬
vestments in any one of the other three branches.^ Exhibit VI shows the
distribution of net fixed assets of Ashland on July 31, 1951•
The future success of Ashland depended in part upon the manner in
which it could adjust to tne trend toward use of large diameter pipelines
for crude oil, and to the increased use of products pipelines in its market
ing territory. Ihe mergers during this postwar period made the company
become more dependent upon common carrier pipelines for crude oil supply
2
to its several refineries and for transportation of refined products.
Ihe conpany also began participating in the joint construction of pipelines
during this period. After the construction of the Mid-Valley pipeline,
which brought crude oil into Adiiand's marketing area from Texas oil fields
had seriously challenged Ashland’s low cost barge transportation, it began
participation in the construction of the El Hancho pipeline, a 2h inch line
from West Texas to the Gulf Coast, where the cnde oil could be delivered
to its towboats and barges which would transport the oil to compapy owned
terminals or refineries.^
Because of the increase in refinery capacity and in the demand for
petroleum products after the war, Ashland had to expand its marketing facil
ities and its marketing area. Immediately following the war, the company
















Source; Joseph L. Massie, Blazer and Ashland Oil (Lexington,
I960), pp. 131-132.
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and in 19U7> a large part of sales had resulted from increased volume
through existing outlets and through additional independent jobbers who
welcomed the opportunity to become Ashland distributors because of the
shortage of products. Products of the company were sold under the new
brand name, "Ashland,” and under approximately l50 individual brand names
of independent distributors, many of which used the emblem "Independent
Quality Service," that identified them as marketers of Ashland products.^
As a result of the mergers which took place during the postwar
period, Ashland's operations at the marketing phase became more complex —
eachoompany which was acquired had become well-known in the community in
which it sold prior to the merger, and Ashland owned five brands of gaso¬
line and many brands of lubricating oil. Some of the more prominent brand
names were "Frontier," which had been established as a single-grade brand
of gasoline in its marketing areaj "Aetna," operating in Central, Southern,
and Western Kentucky and "Valvoline," an internationally distributed lubri¬
cated oil.
Sales of all company products increasing during 1950 and 1951 at a
rate of approximately forty per cent per annum. This increase was due in
part from the addition of new facilities, nflaich had been acquired through
2
merger, and from the internal growth of the sales program of the company.
The sales program was outlined in the annual report for 1952: "Although
Ashland and its affiliated companies own and serve many hundreds of service
stations, the greater part of the company's output of gasoline and motor




to be the best source of supply for these aggressive, independent business¬
men. Frontier, Allied, and Aetna divisions deliver heating oils to thou¬
sands of homes, principally in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Louisville, but again,
independent jobbers distribute most of the company's output of fuel for
household heating."^
In its effort to develop a more unified sales program,Ashland re¬
tained more policy formulation at the home office, adopted a system of
universal credit cards to meet the competition of credit systems of larger
companies, and increased advertising program^ which were based primarily 3
2
on the theme of the company as a local citizen*
Changes in Refinery Operations.—The petroleum industry also exper¬
ienced a change in refinery operations during the period following World
War II, Cracking facilities were increased and facilities were also in¬
creased to enable refiners to manufacture new products, such as petro-chem-
icals, and new types of lubricants. The new equipment installed during this
period not only provided greater flexibility of operation, but made higher
quality products which were necessary to meet the requirements cf improved
automotive design. The change in engine design created an increasing demand
3
for premium grade gasolines, and this was done by manufacturing gasoline
with a higher octane number.
In the petroleum industry it is necessary to keep plants modernized





The Pure Oil Company, 19U9, op. cit., p. 10.
The Pure Oil Company, 19U8, Annual Report, for the year ending,
December 31, 19U8, p. 5.
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is one of the most important factors which has contributed heavily to the
success and failure of many companies, "The development of refining pro¬
cesses has been highly dynamic and the state of the refining art has been
undergoing change at a seemingly ever accelerating pace,"^ It was a wide¬
ly held view among refiners in 1952 that it was impossible to build a com¬
pletely modern refinery. Although all the latest developments might be
included in the design of a new plant, the refinery would inevitably be
2
obsolete in some respects before it was erected and in operation.
The gains offered by new developments are such that it is necessary
for refiners to either provide the required funds for improvements or to
3
suffer losses in competitive position,'^
In the postwar period, the management of Ashland realized that the
problem it was confronted with was one of providing adequate funds for ex¬
penditures to be used in refinery modernization. This problem was intensi¬
fied by the fact that between 19U7 and^l950, the company acquired seven
additional refineries which were relatively obsoletej however, through re¬
tained earnings, issuance of additional stocks, bonds, and promissory notes,
Ashland was able to secure the necessary funds for its modernization pro¬
gram.
Throughout the history of the company, it had obtained additional
funds when such funds were available in the market rather than when they
were needed. It was assumed that the funds could be used profitably at




sometime in the future.^ During the postwar period, not only did the
company need additional funds, but they were available to it. Listed
in Exhibit VII are some of the additional funds which were secured by
Ashland during the period. These funds were used for expansion of other
facilities as well as for modernization and expansion of refining pro¬
cesses and equipment.
Ashland’s postwar modernization program began with the purchase
of a government owned refining plant. This plant was constmcted in 19UU
at a cost of ^16,000,000.00. Ashland entered into an amended lease agree¬
ment with the government, through the Defense Plant Corporation^ whereby
the company conveyed at cost a portion of a plant site adjacent to its
refineiy at Catlettsburg, Kentucky, to construct and purchase the neces¬
sary equipment for a plant to be used in the production of 100-octane avi¬
ation gasoline.^
At the end of the war, the plant was purchased by Ashland from the
government at a cost of $2,150,000.00. Improvements amounting to $650,000.00
were made. The ownership and modernization of this plant enabled the man¬
agement to acquire property with a minimum investment, gave the company
sufficient facilities for production of high-octane gasolines, provided an
adequate amount of high actane gasoline to use as blending stock for less
modem plants, and to keep pace with improvements in the industry. Also,
3
this plant had a capacity of 22,000 barrels per day.
A fluid catalytic cracking unit was constructed at the refinery
—
Massie, op. cit., p. 199.
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SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR OPERATIONS ~ ASHLAND OIL
AND REFINING COMPANY, 19UU-1951
Year Funds
Secured Type of Debt Amount Purpose
19kh Promissory note $3,750,000 To retire previous notes





1,000,000 5000 shares issued in con¬
nection with retirement of
preference stock of Ash¬
land Refining Company and
5000 shares issued in con¬
nection with purchase of





5,000,000 Net proceeds applied to
redemption of $% preferred
stock not exchanged ($165,
76U,25), and for additional
oil and gas supplies, fac¬
ilities, and properties.
Balance for working capital
19U5 Sinking fund
debentures (3's) 5,000,000
Net proceeds used to pre¬
pay $3,750,000 promissory












$15,000,000 200,000 shares and common
stock (357,500 shares)
issued in merger with
Allied Oil Coii?)any in ex¬
change for its common




EXHIBIT VII — Continued
Year Funds
Secured Type of Debt Amount Purpose
1950 Debenture 3's $15,000,000 Proceeds, with other finan¬
cing, to retire debenture
3^'s due in 1962, and for
acquisition of Aetna Oil
Company, Freedom-Valvoline






1951 Debenture 3^'s 7,000,000 Proceeds, with other final-


















Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Industrial Manual (New York.
19U5), pp. 11;2-1U3.
Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Industrial Manual (New York.
1938), pp. U20-U21.
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located in Canton, Ohio and throughput was increased from 17,000 barrels
per day to 30,000 barrels per day in 1952. 1953, another fluid cataly¬
tic cracking unit was constructed at the Buffalo refinery,^
Some of the old refineries which had been acquired between 19U7 and
1950 were improved. The combined capacity of these plants when acquired
2
was ii6,500 barrels per day. In 195l> this capacity had increased by
Exhibit VIII lists the refineries which were acquired by Ashland during the
period, and shows the year in which each was acquired as well as the orig¬
inal and increased amount of capacity.
Ashland specialized in improving the efficiency of relatively old
refineries and processing equipment. The overall refining efficiency was
considered to be a very important factor in the competitive strength of the
company. The management was interested in the redesign and renovations of
refinery equipment, and it maintained an excellent staff of refinery engi¬
neers which played an important role in the success of the postwar expan¬
sion program. Improvements were along three general lines. First, the
bottleneck operations are removed. The limiting factor in many cases on
the refinery throughput was relatively inexpensive equipment, such as heat
exchangers or pumps. In planning, an upper limit was set on the amount to
be spent for improvements, and increased throughput was usually gotten
through certain modifications which did not involve the replacing of the
basic process units.
Reduction of refinery fuel oil consumption was a second method in




McLean, op. cit.. p. 65U.
EXHIBIT VIII
COMPARATIVE OPERATING CAPACITY — ASHLAND OIL AND REFINING COMPANY
19U7-1951




Niles, Ohio Western Reserve Oil
Company
19i;7
2000 barrels per day
2000 barrels per
day
Canton, Ohio Allied Oil Company 19U8
10,000 barrels per day
19,000 barrels
per day
Louisville, Kentucky Aetna Oil Company 1950
8000 barrels per day
10,000 barrels
per day
Freedom, Pennsylvania Freedom-Valvoline Oil
Company
1950
UOOO barrels per day
5000 barrels per
day
Tonawanda, New York Frontier Oil Refining
Company
1950
9000 barrels per day
15,000 barrels
per day
Findlay, Ohio National Refining
Company
1950
9000 barrels per day
lii,000 barrels
per day
St. Elmo, Illinois Northwestern Refining
Company '
1950
I4.50O barrels per day
U500 barrels per
day
Total U6,500 barrels per day 67,500 barrels
per day
Source; John G. McLean and Robert W. Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies
(Boston, 19Sk), p. 65U. ^ “■
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supplementary heat exchangers.
The third method by which the old refineries were improved was the
elimination of excessive labor costs. Ashland followed the general rule
of thumb, that eight men should be required per 1000 barrels of crude oil
throughput.
employing these measures, operations benefited, and plant in¬
vestments were held to a minimum.
As previously mentioned, Ashland operated some of its refineries on
a standby basis. These refineries weren't operated until there was a favor¬
able demand for certain products such as residual fuel oils. The company
also was able to adjust its overall operations to meet special demand sit¬
uations by adjusting refinery yields rapidly to take advantage of short
term shifts in prices of refined products. Refinery yields were planned
in such a manner that the sales department could maximize sales realiza¬
tions at all times. Considerable refining know-how was required to shift
yields frequently, and Ashland's refinery superintendents were specially
trained to alter refinery yields rapidly. Ashland also relied heavily on
large products storage capacity to store those products on which a seasonal
or longer term price increase was expected.^
The increase demand for higher octanes brought a reappraisal of all
of the company's refineries and consideration of the possibilities of clos¬
ing the less efficient plants.
The St. Elmo refinery was dismantled in 1955, and the Niles plant
was placed on standby basis. By 195U, the catalytic cracking unit of the
company's government constructed refinery had become obsolete. New
Ibid., pp. 65U-658.
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catalytic equipment liras added to it in order to enable the company to main¬
tain its competitive position in the octane race.
Ashland also decided to discontinue operations at its old refinery
located in Catlettsburg in 1955. This equipment had been in operation for
thirty years. The Louisville refinery, which had no catalytic cracking
facilities, was also closed down in 1955.
After the postwar expansion, refining continued to be the branch
which received greatest emphasis by the Ashland management. The idea of
maintaining flexibility in management and operations was most valuable in
this branch, and the past success of the compare was mainly the result of
its efficiency in refining and the adaptability of production to consumer
demand for multiple products.^
Extent of Company Participation in the Industry during 1955.—^ 1955,
Ashland had grown considerably. This growth was accomplished mainly by
accretion and ly merger of approximately fifty companies, with the more im-
2
portant companies being acquired during 19i;8-50 (see Exhibit VIII).
Total assets of the company increased by ninety-five per cent from
I9U0 through 1955. Exhibit IX illustrates the growth of Ashland since its
beginning in 1936. The exhibit shows that the total assets increased by a
small amount from I9U0 through 19U7. During 19ii8, total assets began to
increase tremendously. In 19U8, total assets were $65,800,000.00. By 1950,
•3
they had increased to $103,700,000.00,^ a.nd during 1955, they increased to
1 ' ——
Massie, op. cit., pp. 137-138.
2
Ibid., p. 2.































Net sales of Ashland increased from $8,000,000.00 in 19U0 to
I•2li6,000,000.00 in 1955.^ The percentage increase during this period was
95 per cent. Net sales increased every year except 19U6 and 195U. The
decrease in 19U6 was due to a decrease in demand for petroleum products
immediately following World War II, which was brought about because of the
time required for car manufacturers and other industrial firms to recon¬
vert their plants for peacetime operations, and by the time required for
many consumers to reconvert coal furnaces to oil.
The decrease of net sales in 195U was caused by the surplus amount
of supplies on the market and by the crude oil purchasing policies of
Ashland, which made it difficult to sell the large quantity of supplies on
hand during the year. Exhibit X shows the net sales of the company from
I9U0 through 1955.
In 19i4.0, the net income after taxes for Ashland was $697^000.00.
From 19i^l through 19U5^ policies of the industry were dictated by the
government, and as shown in Exhibit XI, net income fluctuated furing this
period. Because of the excess profits tax factor, heavy eacpenditures were
made for production and exploration activities; thereby decreasing the
amount of income.^ Net income showed a continuous increase after the war
^Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Industrial Manual (New York, 1956),
p. 153.
2
Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Industrial Manual (New York, 19U2),
p. 36U.
^Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., 1956, p. 153.
























































until 1952. In that year, the company's earnings were reduced from
$12,137,972.00 in 1951 to 700,273.00,^ This was due to excess profits
tax which was again introduced in 1950 because of the Korean War. Approx¬
imately $15^000,000.00 were spent during 1951 and 1952 for exploration and
development of crude oil in East Texas; difficulties in bringing the neces¬
sary volume of oil to the surface necessitated a write down of assets by
2
$8,500,000,00, and reduced earnings by which expansion could be maintained.
The decrease of net income in 195h was brought about by excess amount
of supplies on hand during that year.
Ashland's employees numbered 800 in 19h0,^ By 1955, the company had
grown to such an extent that it required U300 employees,^ an increase of
71 per cent.
Common stockholders of the company, which increased dU per cent,
numbered 22,656 in 1955 and 3,608 in I9U0. The number of preferred stock¬
holders increased from li66 into 19i;0^ to 8,791 in 1955.^ The percentage in¬
crease for preferred stock during the period was 95 per cent.
The Ashland Oil and Refining Company, in 1955, was engaged directly
or through subsidiaries in all phases of the oil industry. It produced,
purchased, sold, and refined crude oil. Ashland manufactured and sold a
wide lire of refined products at wholesale and retail, purchased and sold
^Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 1956), p. 151;.
2
Massie, op cit., pp. 132-133,
3
Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 19Ul), p. 299.
Sloody's Investor Service, op. cit.. (New York, 1956), p. 153,
Goody's Investor Service, op. cit,, (New York, 19l;l), p. 299.
Goody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 1956), p. 153.
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fuel oils for industrial and domestic consumption, and operated transporta¬
tion both in connection with its own operations and as a contract cairier.
Crude oil requirements were obtained from the company's own produc¬
tion, purchases at the point of production, and other purchases, such as
purchases from other companies both major and minor.
Purchases at the point of production were made principally in Eastern
Kentucky, from jointly owned wells in various states, and from independent
producers in the Illinois Basin, Texas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West
Virginia, Louisiana, and Arkansas.
During 1955» Ashland participated in drilling ninety-one wells, of
which forty-four were productive, and it had an interest in fifty-one water
floods in various stages of development in Eastern Kentucky, Illinois, and
Oklahoma.
Total crude oil produced and purchased in 1955 was UU,8l5»136 barrels.
2
Crude oil production in 19U0 was 393,658. The amount of crude oil processed
during 1955 was UO,289,6UO barrels,^ and the amount processed in 19U0 was
3,207,U81 barrels.^ The daily average of crude oil processed in 1955 was
110,383 barrels, while the daily average in 19ii0 was 8788 barrels.
Ashland owned seven refineries in 1955 which had a combined capacity
of lU8,500 barrels per day. Exhibit XII lists the location and capacity of




Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 19Ul), p, 299.
3
Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 1956), p. 15U.
's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 19iil), p. 299.
EXHIBIT XII
REFINERIES 01,\fNED AND OPERATED BY ASHLAND OIL
AND REFINING COMPANY, 1955
LOCATION CAPACITY
Catlettsburg, Kentucky , 55,000
Canton, Ohio ...... ... 30,000
Tonawanda, New York 28,000
Findlay, Ohio 15,000
Louisville, Kentucky (Not operating) 10,000
Freedom, Pennsylvania. 5,500
Niles, Ohio (Not operating) 5,000
Total li;B,500
Source: Moody's Investor Service, Moody's Industrial Manual (N(
York, 1956), p. 153.
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additional refineries and making improvements on another.
Eefined products of the company included gasoline, industrial
naphthas, kerosene, light and heavy fuel oils, industrial and road ashalts,
coal spray oils, industrial and automotive lubricants, greases, waxes,
petrolatums, liquefied petroleum gases, and otiier specialties.
By 1955, Ashland had become one of the largest transporters of petro¬
leum and petroleum products on United States inland waterways. It owned
nine towboats and a fleet of barges. Nineteen river terminals owned by the
company were located in Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The company also owned five pipeline terminals
which were located in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. Six tankers with
a total capacity of 198,000 barrels; two vessels with a total capacity of
51,000 barrels; and one ocean tanker were also owned by Ashland.
Ashland also owned 3,169 miles of crude oil gathering lines in
Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
The company owned and undivided one-half interest in and operated 26l miles
of crude oil gathering lines known as the Tex Harvey pipeline. Also, the
Owensboro-Ashland Company, jointly owned,by Ashland and Standard Oil Company
of Ohio, included 5l8 miles of gathering lines in.Kentucky.
The marketing area of Ashland included most of the region from the
Mississippi River to the Appalachians, and from the Great Lakes to Central
Tennessee, which included Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Penn¬
sylvania, West Virginia, Tennessee, and New York.
The major portion of the output of gas, kerosene, and furnace distil¬
lates was sold to wholesale distributors. The' company also marketed through
172 bulk plants all of which were owned or leased, and seized a large number
of independent dealers and about 3,200 service stations, which were owned.
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leased or equipped by the company.
Ashland's "Valvoline" lubricating oil was distributed by lij.,000
dealers and marketed through the sales organization of the company and
subsidiaries in the United States as well as in four foreign countries.
Asphalt was sold to the coal industry in West Virginia and Ken¬
tucky while diesel fuel was marketed in the Great Lakes area. Eastern
Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.^
'Moody's Investor Service, op. cit., (New York, 1956), pp. 153-155.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The problem of this study was to determine how the various elements
or changes in the structure and activities of the petroleum industry
affected the growth and development of Ashland Oil and Refining Company
from 19U0 through 1955* The specific problems of this study were the gov¬
ernmental problem, the imported oil dilemma. World War II, the postwar
consumer demand increase, changes in refinery operations, and competition
from larger companies.
The basic hypothesis of this study was that the Ashland Oil and
Refining Company, like many other small companies in the petroleum indus¬
try continued to grow and prosper in spite of the many problems with which
it was confronted.
Governmental attempts at regulation of the industry affected the
growth and development of Ashland, The proration and conservation laws
were among the more important governmental regulatory measures. They af¬
fected the crude oil production activities of the company. Prior to prora¬
tioning, Ashland had very few problems in securing an adequate amount of
crude oil. After prorationing, the price of crude oil became higher and
more stabilized, and producers were limited in the araoiint of crude oil that
could be produced, Ashland, being a small company, purchasing most of its
crude oil requirements from independent producers, did not have any control
over its supply, and its finances were limited.
As a partial solution to the problems brought about through
87
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prorationing, the company improved transportation facilities, and integrated
backwards through purchase of producing properties from time to time whenever
it was profitable to do so.
The various court decisions of the period involving unfair practices
by some companies, and ownership rights to offshore oil had very little af¬
fect upon operations of Ashland, but they were of great concern to the com¬
pany because its management disliked the idea of governmental regulation of
industry operations.
Imported oil was the second element with which the company was con¬
fronted, As the amovint of imported oil increased, the problems continued
to mount for Ashland, The company had an excess supply of crude oil which
came about because of the difficulty involved in cutting off sources of
supply and because of the influx of imported oil, Ashland was also caught
between stabilized prices of crude oil that it bought and the wholesale
market. This occurred because of severe prorationing which was aggravated
by the importation of low cost crude oil.
The problem was remedied when the government applied restrictions
on imports through the enactment of an amendment to the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1955•
World War II brought about the factor of excess profits taxes, gov¬
ernment control of industry operations and activities, transportation,
supply, and manpower problems for Ashland, Operations of the company were
affected at all levels, and it wasn't until after the war that the company
was able to resume normal operations.
The consumer demand increase for petroleum products was such that
it caused severe shortages of supply in the period following the war.
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Although this condition affected the operations of the company, Ashland
was still able to secure adequate supplies and to shift its refinery yield
to the manufacture of those products in shortest supply. It also integrated
backwards into production in an effort to secure additional crude oil
supplies and because of the re-introduction of the excess profits tax
factor,
Ashland also experienced transportation difficulties from competitors
with large diameter pipelines as it expanded its marketing areaj however,
as it continued to grow, this problem was minimized through the use of
common carrier pipelines and Jointly constructed crude oil and products
pipelines.
The final element affecting the growth and development of Ashland
during the period was changes in refinery operations. The problem that it
faced was one of providing adequate funds for expenditures to be used in
refinery modernization. At this time, it owned at least nine refineries,
most of which were relatively old and obsolete. Additional funds were
available in the market, and were secured by the company. These funds,
along with retained earnings, enabled Ashland to improve and modernize
some of its plants. Those that were not improved or modernized, were either
put on standby basis, closed down, or dismantled. In 1955> it owned seven
refineries with a combined capacity of ll4.8,500 barrels per day.
In spite of the many problems with which it had been confronted
during the period, Ashland Oil and Refining Company continued to grow and
prosper. In 1955, it was no longer considered a small company. It was
engaged directly or through subsidiaries in all phases of the oil industry,
and it had grown to become one of the largest transporters of petroleum and
petroleum products on the United States inland waterways. Total assets and
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net sales had increased by ninety-five per cent; net income by ninety-seven
per cent, the number of employees by seventy-one per cent, and the number
of stockholders by eighty-seven per cent,
Ashland had grown from a small refining company in 1936 to a sub¬
stantially large company in 1955, which was due in part to the rapid growth
by merger and consolidation, and to efficient management,
Ashland Oil and Refining Company is only one of the many companies
operating in the petroleum industry but its growth is representative of
the type of growth which can be experienced by most companies if they have
an efficient management which is capable of adjusting its operations as the
situation in the market demands, and one which has the ability to secure
and provide additional funds when needed, both of which are necessary in
the fast growing and rapidly changing petroleum industry.
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